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Abstract
Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making
the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging.  As developed theoretically in this
paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental
education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone.  Such a
design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in
terms of their impact on agents’ incentive compatibilities.  Specifically, in a principal-agent
model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas
educational programs are not.  The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education
programs and voluntary agreements.  With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to
concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start
constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and
economic goals.
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in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism
Legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of mandatory command and control regulations for
environmental abatement have shifted mechanisms toward voluntary agreements such as the
contract-based regulation evaluated by Bontems and Thomas.  Their article is an excellent
illustration of the power and complexity of potential contractual agreements addressing nonpoint-
source pollution.  Complexity is most apparent with information asymmetries, making designing
efficient mechanisms particularly challenging.  As addressed by Bénabou and Tirole, providing
incentives for voluntary actions can have a perverse effect, when considering social reputation, of
reducing the level of voluntaryism.  Paying for blood donors could actually reduce supply
(Titmuss), and imposing stiffer penalties could undermine agents’ justification for obeying the
law (Akerlof and Dickens).  Consideration of optimal agent incentives when faced with
information asymmetries and social reputation may require a new environmental paradigm.  As
developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary
agreements with environmental education offers a mechanism which accounts for information
asymmetry and reputation.  Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary versus
educational incentives in terms of their impact on agents’ incentive compatibilities.  Specifically,
in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility
constraint, whereas educational programs are not.  As demonstrated in the theoretical
development, this key difference can tilt the optimal allocation of voluntary agreements and
educational programs toward the latter. 
The new environmental paradigm, with voluntary agreements and education as linchpins,
has not received an adequate theoretical development, especially in the presence of information2
asymmetries.  Previous literature addresses voluntary agreements as a dichotomist zero-one
tradeoff.  In terms of addressing differences in the old versus the new paradigm, either mandatory
controls or voluntary agreements are implemented or voluntary agreements are addressed in
isolation from other mechanisms.  For economic and policy analysis the question should not be
framed in zero-one totals, but instead in terms of marginal contributions and costs.  This yields
an optimal combination of voluntary and educational mechanisms for policy. 
The aim of this paper is to outline theoretically how voluntary agreements are not
established in isolation of other mechanisms such as education.  Instead mechanisms are
designed to support and enhance one another.  For example, in 2003 the EPA sponsored the third
national conference on nonpoint-source pollution information and education programs (Kiefer
and Kirschner).  This conference highlights the importance of environmental education in the
new environmental paradigm.  Policy is being framed and programs initiated for educating agents
on the environmental consequences of their productive actions. 
New Order of Regulatory Capitalism
In almost every sector of the economy, a new order of regulatory capitalism has existed since the
1980s (Levi-Faur).  This new order differs from older forms of capitalist governance which relied
on mandatory command and control policies.  In terms of environmental quality, the new order is
characterized by a proliferation of new technologies for regulation, with self-regulation in the
shadow of the state, and the growth of international networks of environmental experts.  This
new order goes beyond privatization by including increased delegation to autonomous agents and
the formalization of principal and agent relationships.   3
As addressed by Khanna, for environmental quality, the new order is the result of
growing doubts in the effectiveness of command and control regulations for environmental
abatement.  Alternative flexible instruments based on price signals with economic incentives are
the tools for the new order.  These new environmental instruments are to a large part explained
by the international diffusion of a new regulatory paradigm (Busch, Jörgens, and Tews; Wheeler
and Afsah).  This regulatory capitalism is more open to collective actions than is usually
portrayed by both advocates and opponents of freer markets.  The foundation of the new
paradigm is voluntary agreements supported with environmental education (Dietz and Stern). 
However, asymmetric information associated with agents’ efforts toward environmental
abatement makes designing efficient mechanisms based on the new paradigm challenging. 
Information asymmetry is particularly a problem in markets with numerous nonpoint-source
polluting agents, where hidden actions are constraints to efficient environmental mechanism
design.  Glachant indicates a voluntary agreement has higher costs relative to mandatory control
in the presence of information asymmetries with a large number of agents.  This suggests
voluntary agreements alone might not yield a Pareto-efficient or even a second-best Pareto-
efficient mechanism design given information asymmetries.  A case study by Murphy and
Jaccard of BC Hydro, a publicly-owned British Columbia electric utility, supports this
implication.  Their analysis suggests a voluntary program had little effect on the utility’s
environmental effort.  As indicated in Poe et al., a large gap exists between actual and socially
desirable levels of agents’ environmental efforts.  The Bontems and Thomas investigation is a
case in point.
Other mechanisms yielding voluntary efforts toward a cleaner environment4
complementing agreements among the principal and agents are possible.  The literature is rich in
enumerating cases where educating agents to the environmental consequences of their actions
can elicit voluntary environmental effort from agents (Alrusheidat; Dasgupta; Edmonds; Norton,
Phipps, and Fletcher; Polunin; Price).  Glachant alludes to the possible advantage of education by
indicating that collective learning may have significant cost advantages in the presence of
homogeneous agents.  To the degree educational programs are nonrival, they are still effective
even with a relatively large number of agents.  Furthermore, they do not suffer from possible
free-riding strategic behavior characterized by voluntary agreements.  This is particularly
important in the presence of nonpoint-source pollution where it may be difficult to determine
even the number of polluting agents, yet alone their contributions to the externality.  By its
definition, nonpoint-source pollution is a case of asymmetric information.  Regulatory efforts
should focus on mechanisms which mitigate the inefficiencies associated with the presence of
moral hazard. 
Old Versus New Paradigm Comparisons
The shift in environmental paradigms has not gone unnoticed in the economics literature.  As
outlined in literature reviews, both Alberini and Segerson, followed by Khanna, acknowledge a
number of studies empirically analyzing the decisions of agents to participate in voluntary EPA
programs such as the 33/50, Green Lights, and WasteWise programs.  Specifically, Stranlund
provided one of the first investigations of the relative efficiency between mandatory and
voluntary mechanisms in achieving environmental objectives.  He models agent compliance to an
environmental norm and develops the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voluntary5
compliance regime to be a welfare improvement.  These conditions depend on the degree of
rivalness and excludability of public effort, and the relative costs of private to public effort.  Wu
and Babcock (1999) extend and generalize Stranlund’s model to examine if voluntary programs
can be constructed which dominate mandatory programs for controlling nonpoint-source
pollution.  In a game-theoretic framework, Segerson and Miceli examine if a voluntary versus a
mandatory mechanism is the likely outcome of interaction, and if so, whether the resulting
voluntary mechanism results in an environmentally efficient level of protection. 
In the new paradigm framework, by publicly providing environmental education, agents
are able to make informed decisions on the environmental effects of their actions.  Once
informed of the production advantages and marketing benefits associated with environmental
effort, agents will pursue this effort on their own accord.  This has lead to popular new
catchphrases, such as “the natural step, eco-efficiency, and triple bottom line” (Murphy and
Jaccard).  Agents’ incentives for modifying their effort toward environmental abatement in
response to environmental education may trump any voluntary agreements, lowering their costs
of abatement, and enhancing their relations with a regulatory authority.
As addressed by Feather and Amacher, a lack of agent information regarding both the
profitability and the environmental benefits of expending environmental effort may account for
limited adoption.  When environmental effort depends primarily upon producer perceptions,
financial incentives, including cost sharing or tax exemptions, can be relatively costly.  An
alternative is to implement programs that educate agents.  Especially given any nonrival
characteristics of education programs, it is hypothesized they could dominate any financial
incentive.  Feather and Amacher support this hypothesis by indicating producer perceptions do6
play a major role in explaining environmental effort.  However, findings by Tucker and Napier
suggest the variability of agents’ information-use patterns and perceptions indicate significant
information rivalness, reducing any cost advantages of broad-based approaches for delivering
educational information.  Thus, educational programs are likely to have a greater impact if
targeted to the interests and characteristics of specific agents with similar educational
deficiencies.  This result is supported in the empirical work of Wang, Young, and Camara.  In
their investigation of agricultural wind erosion control, they found, in contrast to general
environmental education, targeted educational programs, which highlight the environmental
threat of wind erosion and potentially profitable abatement practices, had significant positive
impacts on agents’ environmental efforts.
One such targeted program developed by the USDA cooperative extension service is
“best management practices” (BMPs), aimed at reducing movement of nutrients, pesticides, and
sediments into surface water resources.  In terms of net returns, Valentin, Bernardo, and Kastens
indicate the effects on net returns from the adoption of BMPs is mixed.  For wheat and corn
production, nutrient BMPs positively impact net returns.  In contrast, a small but negative
relation with net returns exists for herbicides on corn.  They suggested this negative relation may
be explained by agents not educated in the correct application of herbicides, so educational
programs addressing producer application of practices, as opposed to simply encouraging
adoption, may be warranted.  In this regard, various computer programs have been developed to
aid agents in acquiring information.  For example, computer decision-support programs for
agents’ environmental effort have been developed (Collentine, Larsson, and Hannerz) 
A positive link between environmental education and agent effort is extensively7
supported in the literature.  Other studies all indicate that more experienced and educated agents
will expend more environmental effort (Baidu-Forson; Lichtenberg and Zimmerman; Lohr and
Park; Lohr, Park, and Higley; and McCann and Easter).
  With the literature indicating both voluntary agreements and educational programs
exerting a positive influence on agents’ environmental effort, the objective underlying the new
paradigm is determining the relative combination of these mechanisms.  Identifying and
packaging voluntary agreements with educational programs can increase adoption of the efficient
level of effort and provide a least-cost combination of efforts for obtaining this efficient level
(Cooper).  In terms of concentrated animal feeding operations outside the Clean Water Act’s
regulatory lens, Poe, et al. conclude a package of voluntary and educational programs can be
expected to generate the desirable level of environmental effort if adequate cost sharing is
provided.  However, in the presence of information asymmetries, determining the optimal
combination of these mechanisms is challenging. 
Theoretical Model
As an initial attempt toward a theoretical development of this new environmental order, Bénabou
and Tirole’s model of prosocial behavior is adapted to a set of n agents generating nonpoint-
source pollution such as nitrogen leaching.  Suppose each agent selects a binary environmental
activity (e.g. a BMP), a, from a choice set A = {0, 1} with 1 representing participation and 0
nonparticipation, where the visibility of this activity varies across other producers, employees,
and consumers.  Choosing a entails a utility cost C(a) which is mitigated by an educational, e, or
a monetary, y, incentive rate or both per unit of a.  Educational incentives could be extension8
sponsored programs or access to literature, and monetary incentives may consist of direct
subsides or taxes and/or qualifying for governmental programs (swampbuster provisions).  These
incentive rates are set by a principal (government bureau) and the individual agent takes them as
given.  
Denoting v and m as agent’s intrinsic valuation for contributing to environmental
activities and the monetary valuation of education, respectively, along with normalizing an
agent’s valuation for money, participation at level a then yields a direct net benefit
a(v + me + y) ! C(a).
Each agent’s preference type v is drawn independently from a continuous distribution density
g(v) with mean G v.  Its realization is private information, known to an agent with participation
level a but not observable by others.  This intrinsic motivation to behave proenvironmentally, v,
can stem from two sources: impact of an agent’s actions on the environment and pleasure of
being an environmentalist.  An agent may care about the overall level of environmental quality to
which his/her actions contribute.  Let this component of utility be w(na G/n ), where a G represents
6
the average participation level for the activity; 6 > 0 is the degree of congestion; and w  measures
the intensity of the agent’s proenvironmentalism.  In addition, an agent may experience the pure
pleasure in being a proenvironmentalist, u, independent of social concerns.  This would make the
agent value his/her own contribution to na G more than other agents.  Combining these pure, u, and
impure, w(n/n ), forms of proenvironmentalism yields v = u + w(n/n ).
66
As addressed by Bénabou and Tirole, in addition to this direct net benefit, decisions carry
reputational costs and benefits, reflecting the judgements and reactions of other producers,
employees, consumers, and the community as a whole.  Assume reputation depends linearly on9
observers’ posterior expectations of the agent’s type v.  Thus, the reputational payoff from
choosing a, given incentive rates e and y is
R(a, e, y) = x((e)E(v*a, e, y),
where ( reflects an agent’s proenvironmental status, and x measures the visibility or salience of
their actions (probability it will be observed by others).  As the visibility of actions cloud, x
declines, information asymmetries, along with their inefficiencies, develop.  The major
difference in monetary and educational incentive rates is reflected in their influence on agents’
reputational payoffs.  Education has the potential of altering agents’ appearance of being
environmentally concerned, ((e), which creates a self-incentive on the part of agents toward
adoption of environmental activities.  This educational self-incentive supplants an incentive-
compatibility constraint with hidden actions given information asymmetries.  Education offers a
signal of the proenvironmental status of an agent.   In contrast, monetary incentives do not
influence an agent’s level of proenvirnomental status, (.  
The social self esteem benefit, x((e)E(v*a, e, y), is then combined with proenvironmental
motivation, v = u + w(n/n ), where an agent solves
6
max a(v + me + y) ! C(a) + x((e)E(v*a, e, y).
   a
F.O.C.s
c = v + me + y + r(e, y),
where c represents a cost shift from the binary choice represented by a, c = C(1) ! C(0).  The last
term denotes a change in reputational return from a, r = R(1, e, y) ! R(0, e, y).  An agent’s choice
of a reveals the sum of three motivations: intrinsic, v, extrinsic, e and y, and reputational, r.  As
noted by Bénabou and Tirole, all three vary across agents, so learning about v and agents’10
valuation of money, corresponds to a signal-extraction problem.  Higher incentive rates e and y
reduce the informativeness of actions about v while increasing it about money.  The
heterogeneity in agents’ image concerns ( represents an additional source of noise which makes
inferences about both v and money less reliable and which is amplified when actions become
more visible (higher x).   
An agent will now select environmental choices if v > c ! me ! y ! r(e, y) = v (e, y). 
*
This result is consistent with the theoretical implication derived by Lohr, Park, and Higley.  They
determined proenvironmental activities increase with intensity of environmental attitudes.  The
stronger agents’ beliefs regarding the importance of mitigating environmental risk, the greater
their level of action. 
Recall an agent’s intrinsic participation v = u + w(na G/n ), where u is a pure pleasure of
6
being a proenvironmentalist and w is the marginal utility of the public good w(na G/n ).  As with
6
Bénabou and Tirole, take u and w to be independently distributed and denote the mean of w as w G.
Given incentive rates e and y an equilibrium is determined by a threshold v .  Agents’ expected
*
per capita welfare is then
U(v , e, y) = E[w(na G/n ) + a(u ! c + me + y) + x((e)v],
G * 6
                         v
+
mv                 =   [(n ! 1)(w G/n ) + v ! c + me + y]g(v)dv + x((e)G v, *
6
where v  denotes the highest utility, v, among the n agents.  Each agent generates for the other
+
(n ! 1) agents positive spillovers for each activity choice along with direct utility, v ! c + me + y
and average reputation, x((e)G v.   The welfare impact of a marginal increase in agents’
participation is11
(1) !MU(v , e, y)/Mv  = [(n ! 1)(w G/n ) + v  ! c + me + y]g(v ),
G ** 6 **
                          = [(n ! 1)(w G/n ) ! )(v )]g(v ).
  6 **
The first term on the right-hand side is the public-goods externality which may be denoted as
G z = (n ! 1)(w G/n ).  The second term reflects the condition that each marginal participant brings
6
down the reputation of proenvironmentist as well as that of antienvironmentists.  As noted by
Bénabou and Tirole, the reputational losses of inframarginal agents on both sides must add up to
the gains of the marginal participant, )(v ) = r(e, y).  Thus, condition (1) is the difference
*
between a free-riding effect and a reputation-stealing effect.
A government environmental bureau’s choice of incentive rates, e and y, leading to a
social optimum may be determined by assuming the bureau internalizes some fraction " 0 [0, 1]
of agents’ welfare and also derives from each agent’s participation a benefit, B.  Bureau’s
expected per agent payoff is then
W(e, y) = "U[v (e, y); e, y] + [B ! d(n)e ! y]a G(e, y),
GG *
where  d(n)  is per unit bureau cost of providing e, and assuming some scale efficiency,
n d /   M d/Mn < 0.  Following Bénabou and Tirole, the bureau discounts agents’ welfare, " < 1,
given some cost of public funds and B > 0 could reflect a different discounting between public
and private funds.  Using (1) the bureau’s F.O.C.s for maximizing its expected payoff are
y (2a) MW(e, y)My = ("MSB ! de ! y)a G  ! (1 ! ")a G(e, y) = 0,
G
e (2b) MW(e, y)Me = ("MSB ! de ! y)a G  + "MRB ! (d ! "m)a G(e, y) = 0,
G
where MSB / G z ! )(v ) + (B/") denotes the marginal social benefits of agent actions and
*
MRB / x(’(e)G v represents the marginal reputational payoff from education.  Given
          v
+12
mv (e, y) y  a G(e, y) =   a(e, y)g(v)dy, then a G  / M(a G, y)/My = !Mv (e, y)/My[g(v )] with similar *
**
evaluations for e.  Note that MRB in (2b) reflects the ability of education to positively influence
an agent’s proenvironmental status.
These F.O.C.s (2) lead to the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: A Ramsey-subsidy ratio weighted by net marginal costs and adjusted for
reputational payoff will yield the optimal level of relative incentives.  Specifically
y y     ,   d ! "m      "MRB
S
(3)  =      !     ,
                                                          
e e    ,    1 ! "       (1 ! ")a G 
S
where the elasticities of average participation level with respect to monetary and educational
yy ee incentives are ,  / a G y/a G and ,  / a G e/a G, respectively.  Note that "/(1 ! ") is the odds ratio or the
relative weight given to agent’s MRB per unit of participation by the environmental bureau.  
PROOF:
Solving for "MSB ! de ! y in (2) and equating yields
(1 ! ")a G     (d ! "m)a G     "MRB  =   !   .
                                                                        
y e e      a G                  a G               a G
Dividing through by (1 ! ") and representing in terms of elasticities results in
 y      e(d ! "m)        "MRBe  =   !   .
                                                                
ye e ,      , (1  !  ")      , (1 ! ")a G
Solving for the incentive ratio, y/e, yields (3).
From (3) the Ramsey-subsidy ratio is the ratio of incentive elasticities weighed by their
respective net marginal costs adjusted by the reputational payoff per unit of participation, MRB/a G,
weighted by the odds ratio.  Note that the net marginal costs are (d ! "m) and (1! ") for
education and monetary incentives, respectively, where d and 1 are the bureau’s marginal costs13
and "m and " are the agent’s discounted monetary marginal utilities.  As the cost of providing
education declines, possibly resulting from scale efficiency as n increases, the lower will be the
optimal ratio.  This would be reinforced with higher MRBs, which also lowers the socially
optimal incentive ratio, y/ e.  If " = 0, the government bureau does not internalize any agent
SS
welfare including reputational welfare.  In this case, the Ramsey-subsidy ratio results,
ye y /e  = d(, /, ).  The optimal ratio is proportional to the elasticities, where the magnitude of the
SS
proportionality is determined by the bureau’s per-agent marginal cost of education.  The more
participation is responsive to the monetary (education) incentive the higher (lower) will be the
optimal ratio.  
The socially optimal level of incentive rates e  and y  may be derived by simultaneously
SS
solving (2)
                           d"
ee          " MSB  !   MRB(, /a G )
                   
                       d ! "m (4a) y =  
S                                                                                 
e                         , (1  !  ")      1 ! "             1 + d   + 
                                                 
yy                       , (d  !  "m)        ,        
y                                              ,
e          "MSB + ("MRB/a G )(   + 1)
                
                                           1 ! " (4b) e =    .
S                                                                                         
y                    , (d  !  "m)      d ! "m             d +   + 
                                                     
ee                    , (1  !  ")            ,        
These optimal incentive levels are listed in Table 1 along with their adjustments under alternative
elasticity and internalized welfare assumptions.  
Given (4), a further investigation of the effect marginal cost of education, d, has on the
optimal incentives is revealed in the following proposition
PROPOSITION 2: (1) The optimal level of education is inversely related to its marginal cost and
(2) if the elasticity of education with respect to its marginal cost is elastic, then the monetary14
incentive is a substitute for education.  Specifically
d  Me/Md / e  < 0, and  
de d M y/Md  / y  > 0 (substitute), if ,  / (Me/Md)(d/e) < !1.
PROOF:
Part 1 follows directly by evaluating the partial derivative of (4b) with respect to d.  Part 2
results by solving (2a) for y
                                   "MSB ! de
S
y =    .
S                                      
                 1 ! "          1 + 
                  
y                    ,     
               
d         ! de  ! e
S
d y =    ,
S                             
               1 ! "         1 + 
                 
y                  ,
               
ed         ! e( ,  + 1)
S
d y =    .
S                                 
               1 ! "         1 + 
                 
y                  ,
ed d If ,  < !1, then y  > 0.
Proposition 2 implies that for the monetary incentive to be an educational substitute,
education must be very responsive to its marginal cost.  In such a case, an increase in the
educational costs yields a relatively large reduction in its level, and the bureau then replaces
education with the monetary incentive.  Analogous to a profit-maximizing firm only operating in
ed the elastic portion of its demand curve, this case of e <  ! 1  is associated with a socially-welfare
maximizing government bureau. 
COROLLARY: The socially optimal level of educational incentives is in the elastic portion of
ed the government bureau’s demand curve.   Specifically, at e , ,  < !1.
S15
PROOF:
y                            ,              1          ! (1 +    +   )d
                                  
ee                       , (1  !  ")      ,
ed ,  =   .
                                                                              
y                    , (d ! "m)      d ! "m             d +   + 
                                                     
ee                    , (1  !  ")            ,        
Factoring out d in the denominator and cancelling
y                                      ,              1                    !  1 +    +   
                                  
ee                                 , (1  !  ")      ,  
ed ,  =   .
                                                                                                            
yy                          ,               1     "m    ,               1 +   +   !      + 1
                                                              
ee e                    , (1  !  ")       ,      d,  1 ! "       
ey If participation is positively related to the incentives, ,  and ,  > 0, then the last term in the
ed denominator is positive yielding ,  < !1.
Given the proposition and corollary, at the optimal incentives, monetary incentives will
be a substitute for education.  This is particularly apparent for " = 1.  In Table 1, e  is determined
S
at the point where the net marginal cost of education (d ! m) equals the MRB.  The monetary
incentive is then y  = MRB ! de , which indicates the substitution of y for e.  Note that, y  could
SS S
be negative, indicating a tax if de  > MRB.  In this case an agent would be paying for some share
S
of the education.
As an aid in further interpreting (4), from Table 1, if e = 0, then (4a) reduces to Bénabou
and Tirole’s (34) page 1672 for the social optimal level of monetary incentives
             "MSB (5) y =    .
S                                    
                 1 ! "           1 + 
                  
y                     ,        
This yields their Proposition 9 for nondistortionary incentive rates, " = 1, y =  y !   ) (c  ! y) ,
SP P
where  y  is the Pigouvian subsidy, y  = G z + B.  The socially optimal incentive rate is always less
PP16
than the Pigouvian subsidy.  In contrast to Bénabou and Tirole’s (34), (4a) is augmented not only
by the Ramsey-subsidy ratio but also by the MRB, reflecting the effect reputation enhancement
through educational incentives has on monetary incentives.  This Ramsey ratio measures how
responsive the monetary incentive is to a change in the education incentive.  The more responsive
it is, the lower will be the social optimal level of monetary incentives.  In terms of MRB, an
agent’s change in reputation from an education incentive has an indirect effect on the optimal
level of monetary incentives.  This effect is represented by the last term in the numerator of (4a). 
It measures the decrease in y  from the effects of education on reputation.  Both the Ramsey ratio
S
e and MRB effects result in a more elastic ,  yielding a lower y  which further drives a wedge
S
between the social optimal monetary incentive, y  and the Pigouvian subsidy, y .  In contrast, the
SP
y more elastic , , the higher is y  and narrowing of the wedge. 
S
The optimal level of educational incentive, e , modeled in (4b) is symmetric to (4a) with
S
the exception of the MRB term.  There is a positive direct marginal reputational payoff from
e participation, "MRB/a G , combined with a positive indirect effect, which together augment the
MSB.  This additional direct MRB effect distinguishes education from monetary incentives.  In
contrast to e = 0 yielding Bénabou and Tirole’s (34) for monetary incentives (5), when y = 0
e              "MSB + "MRB/a G (6) e =    .
S                                                           
                       d ! "m                1 + 
                      
e                           ,        
The direct MRB influence on e  implies a qualification to Bénabou and Tirole’s Proposition 9
S
part 1, “that the socially optimal incentive rate is always strictly less than the standard Pigouvian
subsidy.”  Consistent with Bénabou and Tirole’s Proposition 9 part 1 assumptions, let
" = d = m = 1 which results in the following proposition  17
PROPOSITION 3: The socially optimal incentive rate will exceed the standard Pigouvian
subsidy if the marginal reputational payoff of education is greater than the reputation-stealing
effect. 
PROOF:
For y = 0 and " = d = m = 1 
e e  = MSB + MRB/a G ,
S
e     = y  ! )(v ) + MRB/a G ,
P*
and
(6) e + )(v ) = c ! v.
**
Thus,
e v  = c ! y !  MRB/a G .
*P
Substituting into (6)
ee e  = y  + MRB/a G  ! )(c ! y !  MRB/a G ).
SP P
ee The proposition results if MRB/a G  > )(c ! y !  MRB/a G ).  The general result follows from this
P
restricted outcome.  
An important consequence of Proposition 3 is the reputation-stealing effect, addressed by
Bénabou and Tirole resulting in an opprobrium effect, can be mitigated by an educational
incentive which increases an agent’s reputational payoff.  This result is true even in the face of
hidden actions where the visibility of actions, x, is impaired by information asymmetry.   
As indicated in Table 1, when " = 0, the government bureau does not internalize any
fraction of agents’ welfare and only derives a monetary value of B from each agent’s
participation.  Not considering agents’ welfare implies no consideration of each agent’s18
reputation and free-riding effects, so the optimal levels of monetary and education incentives, e
S
ey and  y , depend solely on their elasticities, ,  and , .  In the polar case, where these elasticities
S
become perfectly elastic, agents’ are perfectly responsive to any incentives.  This is analogous to
a command and control policy where agents have no choice in participation.  In contrast, when
the elasticity is zero, there is no responsiveness.  The agents’ are totally shirking.  Considering a
government bureau which internalizes a fraction of agents’ welfare, 0 < " < 1, the command and
control policy results in a weighted Bénabou and Tirole Pigouvian incentive, y =  " MSB for
S
ye e ,   6   4   and the reputational adjusted incentive is e  = MSB + MRB/a G  for ,  6 4. 
S
Voluntary programs imply some degree of agent unresponsiveness, so voluntary
agreements will not yield the same efficient outcome compared with either command and control
or a Pigovian tax mechanism.  This is consistent with Glachant’s results which suggest, in a
Coasen approach under asymmetric information, voluntary agreements are not relatively efficient
when compared with either a command and control or a Pigovian approach.  The result is also
analogous with Peterson and Boisvert who demonstrate any comparative evaluation of command
and control programs with voluntary agreements must weigh the additional cost of self-selection
against the administrative cost and intrusiveness of command and control.     
However, the results listed in Table 1 indicate educational incentives can mitigate this
self-selection problem.  In terms of the educational incentive rate, the associated marginal
reputational benefit of agents’ actions is influenced by the visibility of their actions, x.  A high
visibility of actions will enhance the marginal reputational benefit of actions by revealing agents’
proenvironmental choices.  Education is then a strong signal of proenvironmentalism.  In
contrast, low visibility of actions leading to information asymmetry can result in limited19
responsiveness for educational as well as monetary incentive rates (self-selection problem).  With
hidden actions, government bureaus must satisfy an incentive-compatibility constraint, where
they offer a compensation scheme that provides an agent an incentive to choose the required
action level.  However, a low level of paraticipation can be enhanced by increasing an agent’s
proenvironmental status.  Increasing an agent’s proenviromentalism status can, in contrast to
monetary incentives, mitigate hidden action inefficiency. 
Thus, participation in voluntary agreements can be enhanced through educational
programs designed to reduce costs of learning and integrating environmental activities into an
agent’s production processes.  Government educational programs, aimed at educating agents on
their environmental consequences from production, influence the proenvironmental status of an
agent.  In contrast to monetary incentives, an educational incentive positively impacting an
agent’s proenvironmental status, enhances the responsiveness of agents’ undertaking
environmental activities.
With education positively influencing proenvironmental status, a bureau has an additional
tool for inducting the optimal level of activities.  In contrast to monetary incentives, educational
incentives can offset reputation-stealing effects and a low level of visibility by increasing the
proenvironmental reputation of agents.  The problem of hidden actions as visibility declines can
be mitigated by environmental education.  In terms of information asymmetry terminology, as
opposed to monetary incentives, there is no incentive-compatibility constraint for education.  
Conclusions
The derived optimal incentive rates are consistent with the new order and an environmental20
regulatory paradigm encompassing self-regulation in the shadow of the state with collective
principal and agent actions.  The implication is that joint analysis is required for determining the
total environmental activities of simultaneous applications of voluntary and educational
incentives on agents’ environmental actions.  Considering each mechanism in isolation from
others may bias the results.  As suggested by Wu and Babcock (1998) in the adoption of tillage,
rotation, and soil testing practices, through joint analysis, the effects of alternative combinations
of management practices can be evaluated.  Limited literature exists in jointly considering
environmental agreement and program effects on agents’ response and environmental
enhancement.  One exception is Amacher and Feather who consider the impacts of bundling
BMP programs.  A body of literature does exist on the joint adoption practices of technologies. 
As a foothold to this literature, see Khanna, Epouhe, and Hornbaker. With the new order of
regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-
mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort
toward environmental and economic goals.21
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Table 1. Social Optimal Monetary and Educational Incentives
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Table 1. Continued
Internalized Elasticities      Social Optimal Incentives
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